Peek Inside the Closed World: Evaluating Autoencoder-Based Detection of
  DDoS to Cloud by Guo, Hang et al.
Peek Inside the Closed World:
Evaluating Autoencoder-Based Detection of DDoS to Cloud
Hang Guo
hangguo@isi.edu
USC/ISI
Xun Fan
xufan@microso.com
Microso
Anh Cao
anhcao@microso.com
Microso
Geo Outhred
geoo@microso.com
Microso
John Heidemann
johnh@isi.edu
USC/ISI
ABSTRACT
Machine-learning-based anomaly detection (ML-based AD) has
been successful at detecting DDoS events in the lab. However pub-
lished evaluations of ML-based AD have used only limited data and
provided minimal insight into why it works. To address limited
evaluation against real-world data, we apply autoencoder, an exist-
ing ML-AD model, to 57 DDoS aack events captured at 5 cloud
IPs from a major cloud provider. We show that our models detect
nearly all malicious ows for 2 of the 4 cloud IPs under aack (at
least 99.99%) and detect most malicious ows (94.75% and 91.37%)
for the remaining 2 IPs. Our models also maintain near-zero false
positives on benign ows to all 5 IPs. Our primary contribution
is to improve our understanding for why ML-based AD works on
some malicious ows but not others. We interpret our detection
results with feature aribution and counterfactual explanation. We
show that our models are beer at detecting malicious ows with
anomalies on allow-listed features (those with only a few benign
values) than ows with anomalies on deny-listed features (those
with mostly benign values) because our models are more likely to
learn correct normality for allow-listed features. We then show that
our models are beer at detecting malicious ows with anomalies
on unordered features (that have no ordering among their values)
than ows with anomalies on ordered features because even with
incomplete normality, our models could still detect anomalies on
unordered feature with high recall. Lastly, we summarize the im-
plications of what we learn on applying autoencoder-based AD in
production: training with noisy real-world data is possible, autoen-
coder can reliably detect real-world anomalies on well-represented
unordered features and combinations of autoencoder-based AD
and heuristic-based lters can help both.
1 INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection (AD) is a popular strategy in detecting DDoS
aacks, enabling responses such as ltering. AD identies mali-
cious network trac by proling benign trac and agging trac
deviating from these benign proles as malicious. AD thus assume
one can prole all benign trac paerns and infer the rest as ma-
licious (the closed world assumption [44]). Comparing to binary
classication, another popular strategy in DDoS detection that pro-
les both benign and malicious trac and looks for trac similar
to these known malicious proles, AD could identify both known
and potentially unknown malicious trac.
Machine learning (ML) techniques lead to a new class of DDoS de-
tection study using ML-AD models such as one-class SVM [5, 38, 45]
and neural networks [10, 17, 20]. However, these studies usually
suer from two major weaknesses, limiting their adoption in real-
world, operational networks [34]. First, ML-AD models are oen
evaluated with limited datasets, oen only simulated trac, traf-
c from universities or laboratories, or two public DDoS datasets
(described next). Prior work has suggested that conclusions based
on trac from simulation and small environments do not gener-
alize to real-world environments at larger scales [34]. e public
datasets from DARPA/MIT [14] and KDD CUP [41] are synthetic,
20 years old, and have known problems, making them inadequate
for contemporary research [7, 34]. It is thus unclear how well these
ML-AD models could detect real-world DDoS aacks in operational
networks. Second, prior studies of ML-AD usually do not interpret
their models’ detection and explain why their models work or not
work. Without interpretation, it is dicult for network operators
to understand and act on the detection results of ML-based AD
systems [34]. Without explanations on why detection works, it is
hard to understand the capabilities and limitations of ML-based
AD in DDoS detection and how one could make the best use of
ML-based AD in production environment.
Our paper takes steps to addressing these two limitations by
evaluating ML-based AD with real-world data and interpreting the
results.
Our rst contribution is to evaluate the detection accuracy of
autoencoder, an existing ML-AD model, with real-world DDoS
trac from a large commercial cloud platform (§2.1). We apply our
models to 57 DDoS aack events captured from 5 cloud IPs of this
platform between late-May and early-July 2019 (§2.2). Detection
results show that our models detect almost all malicious aack
ows to 2 of these 4 cloud IPs under aacks (at least 99.99%) and
detect most malicious ows for the remaining 2 IPs (94.75% and
91.37%, §3.1). We show that our models maintain near-zero false
positives on benign trac ows to all 5 IPs (§3.2).
Our second contribution is to interpret our detection results with
feature aribution (§2.4.1) and counterfactual explanation (§2.4.2)
and show why our models work on certain malicious ows but
not the rest (§4). We show that our models are beer at detecting
malicious ows with anomalies on allow-listed features (those with
only a few benign values) than ows with anomalies on deny-listed
features (those with mostly benign values) because our models are
more likely to learn correct normality for allow-listed features (§4.1).
We then show that our models are beer at detecting malicious
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ows with anomalies on unordered features (that have no ordering
among their values) than ows with anomalies on ordered features
because even with incomplete normality, our models could still
detect anomalies on unordered feature with high recall (§4.2). Lastly,
our models detect malicious ows with anomalies on packet payload
content by combining multiple ow features (§4.3). (We summarize
key takeaways from our interpretation results in Table 7.)
Out last contribution is to summarize the implications of what
we learn on using autoencoder-based AD in production (§5): train-
ing with noisy real-world data is possible (§5.1), autoencoder can
reliably detect real-world anomalies on well-represented unordered
features (whose benign values appear frequently in training data,
§5.2) and combinations of autoencoder-based AD and heuristic-
based lters can help both (§5.3).
2 DATASETS AND METHODOLOGY
Our main contribution is to evaluate ML-based AD with real-world
data and interpret the results. Our data is based on a large commer-
cial cloud platform (§2.1) with real-world DDoS events for several
services (§2.2). We then describe our ML-AD models (§2.3) and the
standard techniques we use to interpret them (§2.4).
2.1 Cloud Platform Overview
We study a large commercial cloud platform that is made up of
millions of servers across 140 countries. We study 3 of the wide
range of services this cloud platform hosts. Each of these cloud
services is assigned one or more public virtual IPs (VIP).
is cloud platform has seen increasing DDoS aacks over the
past years and deploys “in-house” DDoS detection and mitigation.
In-house detection begins by detecting DDoS events based on
comparing aggregate inbound trac to an VIP to a DDoS threshold.
In-house mitigation employs ltering and rate limiting. Aer
a DDoS event has been detected, each inbound packet to that VIP
is checked and possibly dropped based on a series of heuristics.
ese heuristics are lters designed by domain experts to identify
and lter known DDoS aacks. Remaining packets are rate limited,
with any that pass the rate limiter passed to the VIP.
e in-house methods consider a DDoS event to end when the
inbound trac rate to this VIP goes under the DDoS threshold for
15 minutes. In-house mitigation is only applied when there is an
ongoing DDoS event (called war time) and is not otherwise applied
(during peace time).
2.2 Cloud DDoS Data
To evaluate ML-based AD, we obtain peace and war-time trac
packet captures (pcaps) from VIPs on this cloud platform and extract
benign user trac and malicious DDoS trac.
Cloud VIPs: We study ve VIPs from three dierent services
hosted on this cloud platform (see Table 1 for anonymized VIPs).
ree of these VIPs (SR1VP1, SR1VP2 and SR1VP3) are instances
of a gaming communication service (SR1), each in a dierent data
center and physical location. e other two VIPs (SR2VP1 and
SR3VP1) belong to two dierent gaming authentication services
(SR2 and SR3).
TracPcaps: We obtain over 100 hours of inbound trac pcaps
to each of these 5 VIPs. Each VIP’s pcaps include all war-time trac
and partial peace-time trac, observed at this VIP in a 8-day period
between late-May and early-July 2019 (specic times in Table 1). We
use partial peace-time trac because we nd more trac does not
increase our models’ accuracy. We observe SR3VP1 for extended
180 hours because this VIP receives less trac than other VIPs. Our
pcaps are sampled, retaining 1 in every 1000 packets.
Our 5 VIPs see dierent distributions of DDoS events in this
period, as in Figure 1. SR1VP3 sees a large number (49) of mostly
short DDoS events (71% being 1 second or less, see red crosses in
Figure 1). e cloud platform’s DDoS team suggests these brief
DDoS events are likely botnets randomly probing IPs. In compar-
ison, SR1VP1 and SR1VP2 see smaller numbers of longer DDoS
events, with median durations of 121 and 140 seconds for their
20 and 27 events (Figure 1). SR2VP1 is frequently aacked, with
about 59 hours of war time, and sees DDoS events of broad range
of durations (from 1 second to more than 14 hours). e cloud’s
DDoS team reports that this VIP is hosting a critical service, so
long aacks are likely aempts to gain media aention. SR3VP1
reports no DDoS events since service SR3 is rarely aacked. We
use SR3VP1 to evaluate false positives with our detection methods.
Benign and Malicious Trac: We report peace-time trac
as “benign trac”. While there may be very small aacks in the
peace-time trac, the cloud platform considers any such events too
small to impact the service and does not lter them. (We choose to
not remove such aacks to evaluate our system on noisy, real-world
trac [7].) War-time trac is also a mix of benign user trac and
malicious DDoS trac. We only consider the fraction of war-time
trac dropped by heuristic-based lters from in-house mitigation
as malicious (annotated as “malicious trac” hereaer), recalling
these heuristics identify known aacks (§2.1). We only use these
malicious trac to evaluate our methods and ignore the rest of
war-time trac since we do not have perfect ground truth for them.
Benign and Malicious Flows: Since our models’ detection
relies on ow-level statistics like packet counts and rates, we rst
aggregate packets from benign and malicious trac as 5-tuple ows.
We summarize the number of benign and malicious ows and
number of DDoS events in these malicious ows in Table 1. Since
our malicious ows come from a subset of war-time trac that
matches in-house mitigation’s heuristics, the DDoS events in mali-
cious ows are a subset of DDoS events in war-time trac pcaps.
Our data is predominantly UDP (99.87% of our 40M ows in
Table 1), likely due to all three cloud services we study are latency-
sensitive gaming services. We have not evaluated if our results
apply to TCP-based services. Future work may relax this limitation.
Extracting Flow Features: We use Argus [26] to extract 23
ow features (see Table 2) from the rst 10 seconds (an empirical
threshold) of each benign and malicious ow.
Our 23 ow features can be categorized into two groups. e
rst group of features (ports, rates, and packet sizes, gray in Table 2)
are those used in in-house mitigation’s heuristics. ese features
enables us to understand if our models use the same features in
detecting certain malicious ows as in-house mitigation does. Other
features (such as ow inter-packet arrival time and packet TTLs,
white columns in Table 2) are not used by in-house mitigation, likely
because they are less intuitive to humans ese features enables
us to explore how well ML-AD models could compliment human
expertise by using more subtle features in detection.
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Figure 1: DDoS Events’ Durations in Trac Pcaps
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Figure 2: Architecture for Our Autoencoders
Total Trac Pcaps Total Trac Flows Training reshold Validation Test
VIPs Peace Hrs War Hrs DDoS Evts Benign Malicious DDoS Evts Benign Benign Benign Malicious Benign Malicious
SR1VP1 110.32 2.31 20 9,930k 119k 20 1,000k 59.5k 59.5k 59.5k 59.5k 59.5k
SR1VP2 96.96 5.44 27 13,107k 1,046k 20 1,000k 523k 523k 523k 523k 523k
SR1VP3 118.88 1.36 49 10,704k 90k 7 1,000k 45k 45k 45k 45k 45k
SR2VP1 57.73 58.89 15 5,469k 37k 10 1,000k 18.5k 18.5k 18.5k 18.5k 18.5k
SR3VP1 182.99 0 0 698k 0 0 548k 50k 50k 0 50k 0
Table 1: Summary of Trac Pcaps and Trac Flows Used in is Paper
While many of our features, such as packet rate (Table 2), are
distorted by data sampling, we believe our detection still works
because our models are trained to identify sampled trac.
Unordered Feature Encoding: Since three of our features
(source port, destination port and protocol) are unordered and
directly using them would implicitly create an ordering among
their values (for example, implying that port 5 is more similar to
port 6 than port 4 is), we use one-hot encoding [8] to avoid this dis-
tortion. We map protocol into 256 one-hot features (is protocol 0,
is protocol 1, … is protocol 255), each with a binary value. Simi-
larly, we map ports into 1286 one-hot features, each representing
a group of 51 adjacent ports (1 to 51, 52 to 102, … 65485 to 65535),
with port 0 used to indicate both illegal TCP/UDP port 0 and non-
existent port in non-TCP-UDP ows. (We group every 51 ports
because otherwise we will need 65536×2 one-hot features to rep-
resent source and destination ports, more than our machine can
handle.) Grouping ports could cause false positives or negatives
if two common ports appear in the same aggregate, we examined
our data and found that all popular ports dier by at least 53 in the
port space and we never group popular ports.
2.3 DDoS Detection Techniques
Having obtained benign and malicious ows, we next describe
the ML models we use and how we train, validate and test these
models with these ows. We developed our specic ML-based AD
techniques ourselves, but we follow the use of autoencoder like
prior work [2, 4, 17, 18] and we specically follow the idea of N-
BaIoT of using reconstruction error to detect DDoS [17]. Our goal is
not to show a new detection method, but to evaluate and interpret
current state-of-the-art methods with real world data.
Model Overview: We use a type of neural-network ML model
called autoencoder because it is widely used in AD (such as system
monitoring [2] and outlier detection [4]) and has been shown to
detect DDoS aacks accurately in lab environment ([17]). While
other ML models are also used for AD, such as one-class SVM [5, 38,
45] and other neural networks [3, 10, 20, 21]. We currently focus
on autoencoder and leave studying other models for future work.
Autoencoder is a symmetric neural network that reconstructs
its input by compressing the input to a smaller dimension and then
expanding it back [37]. e aim of autoencoder is to minimize
reconstruction error, the dierences between input and output (the
reconstructed input). We compute the dierence between input and
output vectors (Fin and Fout ) as the mean of element-wise square
error, as shown in Equation 1 where N is the number of elements in
Fin and Fout ; and F iin (or F
i
out ) is the i-th element in Fin (or Fout ).
E(Fin , Fout ) =
∑N
i=1(F iin − F iout )2
N
(1)
To detect malicious DDoS ows, we train an autoencoder with
only benign ows and identify malicious ows by looking for large
reconstruction errors. e rationale is the autoencoder learns to
recognize useful paerns in the benign ows with, in-eect, lossy
compression. When it encounters statistically dierent ows like
the malicious ows, it cannot compress this anomalous trac ef-
ciently and so produces a relatively large reconstruction error,
with the degree of error reecting the deviation from normal of the
anomaly.
We build a 6-layer neural network for each of our 5 VIPs, com-
pressing a 2848-by-1 input vector (2×1286 one-hot features for
ports, 256 one-hot features for protocols and the other 20 features
in Table 2) to a 4-by-1 vector and expand it back symmetrically
(dimensions of each layer shown in Figure 2). As with many ML
systems, the specic choices of 4-by-1 and 6 layers are empirical,
although we also tried 8 layers without seeing much advantage.
We use ReLu [19] as activation function, L2 regulation [25] and
dropout [35] to prevent overing and mini-batch Adam gradient
descent [13] for model optimization, all following standard best
practices [36]. Our implementation uses pyTorch [24].
3
Sport Dport Proto SrcPkts SrcRate SrcLoad SIntPkt sTtl sMaxPktSz sMinPktSz SrcTCPBase
source dest protocol src-to-dst src-to-dst src-to-dst mean src-to-dst inter TTL in last src src-to-dst src-to-dst src TCP base
port port number pkt count pkt/s bits/s -pkt arrival time -to dst pkt max pkt size min pkt size sequence
TcpOpt {M, w, s, S, e, E, T, c, N, O, SS, D}
the existence of certain TCP option: max segment size (M), window scale (w), selective ACK OK (s), selective ACK (S), TCP echo (e), TCP echo reply (E),
TCP timestamp (T), TCP CC (c), TCP CC New (N), TCP CC Echo (O), TCP src congestion notication (SS) and TCP dest congestion notication (D)
Table 2: Our 23 Flow Features (Merging 12 Features About Existence of Certain TCP Option) Before One-hot Encoding
Model Training: We train each VIP’s autoencoder to accurately
reconstruct benign ows from this VIP.
We rst randomly draw 1 million benign ows from each VIP
as its training dataset (see “training” column of Table 1). SR3VP1
observes only 698k benign ows, even with extended observation,
so there we train on 548k benign ows. (We experimented with
additional training data but did not nd it helped)
We then pre-process training dataset by normalizing training
ows’ feature values to approximately the same scale (about 0 to
1), following best practices [36]. e one-hot features are already
normalized, but for a given other feature i of ow w in the training
dataset (F iw in Equation 2), we normalize it with min-max normal-
ization (Equation 2 where F itmax and F itmin are the maximum and
minimum values for feature i in all training ows).
We initialize four hyper-parameters in our models: mini-batch
size as 128, learning rate as 10−5, drop-out ratio as 50% (per recom-
mendation [35]) and weight decay for L2 regulation ([25]) as 10−5.
(We tune these values during model validation below if needed.)
Lastly, we train our models with normalized training data for 2
epochs. (Adding more epochs does not increase models’ detection
accuracy on validation datasets, and risks overing.)
reshold Calculation: Detecting malicious ows from large
reconstruction error requires a threshold to separate normal error
from anomalies. We calculate this threshold by estimating the upper
bound for benign ows’ errors. We randomly draw benign ows
from each VIP to form threshold datasets (see “threshold” column
of Table 1). We set the size of threshold dataset to match the size
of validation and test dataset (described later this section). Similar
to model training, we pre-process threshold data with min-max
normalization (Equation 2) and maximum and minimum feature
values extracted from training datasets (F itmax and F itmin ). We
apply trained models to ows in threshold dataset and record their
reconstruction errors as E. We calculate detection threshold with
Equation 3 where µE and σE are mean and standard deviation of E.
ˆF iw =
F iw − F itmax
F itmin − F itmax
(2) Tdet = µE + 3σE (3)
Model Validation: We validate detection accuracy of trained
models (with initial hyper-parameters) by applying them to de-
tect benign and malicious ows in validation datasets. When we
encounter poor accuracy in the validation data, we tune hyper-
parameters of the models to improve validation accuracy.
To validate our model, we construct validation dataset for each
VIP by randomly drawing half malicious ows from a VIP and
equal amount of random benign ows from same VIP (shown un-
der “validation” of Table 1). We pre-process validation dataset
with min-max normalization and F itmax and F itmin (Equation 2).
We apply trained models to detect benign and malicious ows in
validation sets and check common accuracy metrics of detection re-
sults: mainly precision (TP/(TP +FP)), recall (TP/(TP +FN )) and F1
score (2 × precision × recall/(precision + recall)) where TP , FP and
FN stands for true positives, false positives and false negatives in
identifying malicious ows. Note that for SR3VP1 where we only
have benign ows, we instead examine its true negative ratio (TNR,
the fraction of benign ows that get correctly detected.)
If any detection metric for a per-VIP model goes under 99%,
we tune this model’s hyper-parameters with random search [1],
by training multiple versions of this model, each with a set of
randomly-chosen values for hyper-parameters. We then select as
the nal model the version that gets the highest F1 score against
the validation dataset and use this nal model for all subsequent
detection. (Table 3 lists hyperparamter values for our nal models.)
Model Testing: Finally, we report detection accuracy for our
trained and validated models by applying them to test datasets,
consisting of the other half of malicious ows extracted from each
VIP and equal amount of random benign ows from the same VIP
(see “Test” of Table 1). Specically, we rst pre-process test dataset
with min-max normalization and F itmax and F itmin (Equation 2).
We then report our models’ detection precision, recall and F1 score
on test dataset. (Similar to validation, we report TNR for SR3VP1.)
2.4 Techniques to Interpret Detections
While our models follow best practices, we are the rst to evaluate
such models with real-world data and interpret the results. We
interpret our models’ detection results with feature aribution
(§2.4.1) and counterfactual explanations analysis (§2.4.2).
2.4.1 Feature Aribution. We use feature aribution analysis
to understand the contribution from each feature to the detection
of each ow instance. Prior work used feature aribution [30, 31,
46, 47]. ey either aribute feature importance by evaluating the
dierence in model output when perturbing each input feature
([46, 47]), or by taking the partial derivative of model output to
each input feature ([30, 31]).
A(j) = (F
j
in − F
j
out )2∑N
i=1(F iin − F iout )2
(4)
Since our models’ detection is based on reconstruction error of
input ow (Equation 1), which is the mean of per-feature errors
from all ow features, we can measure a feature’s contribution to
detection by how much error it contributions to overall reconstruc-
tion error. We normalize per-feature error by dividing it with the
sum of error from all features, as in Equation 4, and aribute that
feature’s contribution as this normalized per-feature error.
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Mini-batch Size Learning Rate Drop-out Ratio Weight Decay
SR1VP1 64 2 × 10−5 10% 10−6
SR2VP1 32 10−5 10% 2 × 10−6
Other VIPs 128 10−5 50% 10−5
Table 3: Hyperparameters Values for Final Models
SR1VP1 SR1VP2 SR1VP3 SR2VP1 SR3VP1
Precision 98.90% 99.69% 99.81% 99.50% –
Recall 94.75% 99.99% 100.0% 91.37% –
F1-Score 96.78% 99.83% 99.90% 95.26% –
TNR – – – – 99.68%
Table 4: Detection Accuracy on Test Dataset
2.4.2 Counterfactual Explanations. Counterfactual explanations
show how an input must change to signicantly change its detection
output, as advocated by prior work [16, 42].We use counterfactual
explanations to understand the normality our models learn for each
ow feature, suggesting values the models consider anomalous.
Specically, we rst nd a base ow that is detected as benign,
then we repeatedly alter the target feature’s value in this base ow
while keeping other features unchanged. We feed these altered
base ows into our model to observe how much the reconstruction
error changes with each perturbation of target feature’s value: an
increase in errors suggests our models consider current feature
value more abnormal than the previous value, and vice versa. We
repeat this experiment on dierent base ows to see if our models
consistently consider certain target feature values more normal
than the other values, with relatively normal values suggesting
normality our models learned.
3 DETECTION RESULTS
To understand how well ML-based AD works in detecting real-
world DDoS aacks, we train and validate an autoencoder model
for each of our 5 VIPs as described in §2.3. We summarize hyperpa-
rameters values for our nal models in Table 3 where models for
SR1VP1 and SR2VP1 use tuned hyperparameters values and models
for other 3 VIPs use initial hyperparamter values from §2.3.
With trained and validated models, we report detection accuracy
on test datasets in §3.1 and examine false positives in §3.2. In
§3.3, we evaluate our models on all malicious ows (recalling test
datasets only contain half of total malicious ows) and interpret
why our models detect some malicious ows but miss others in §4.
3.1 Detection Accuracy on Test Dataset
We evaluate accuracy by measuring precision, recall, F1 score and
TNR of our models’ detection of test datasets in Table 4.
We rst observe that our model’s detection precision and TNR
for all 5 VIPs are high (at least 98.90% in Table 4), suggesting they
rarely generate false alerts: only 2,556 (0.36%) false positives out
of all 696,000 tests of benign ows. (We later show that only 28 of
these 2,556 are actual false positives in §3.2.)
Our second observation is that our models identify almost all
malicious ows to 2 of the 4 VIPs under aack (detection recall
is 99.99% for SR1VP2 and 100% for SR1VP3) and identify most
total false positives 2,556 (100.0%)
actual false positives 28 (1.1%)
actual true positives 2,446 (95.7%) (100.0%)
UDP ows w bad dst port 1,953 (76.5%) (79.8%)
UDP ows w bad src port 4 (0.2%) (0.2%)
UDP ows w bad payload content 2 (0.1%) (0.1%)
ows w bad protocols 487 (19.1%) (19.9%)
misdirected TCP ows 82 (3.2%)
Table 5: False Positives on Test Dataset Breakdown
malicious ows to the other 2 VIPs (recall is 94.75% for SR1VP1 and
91.37% for SR2VP1), as shown in Table 4.
3.2 Examining False Positives on Test Dataset
Our models make 2,556 false positives against the test datasets
(§3.1); we next compare these to in-house mitigation’s heuristics
such as allow-lists of destination ports and protocols.
We rst show most of these false positives (95.7%, 2,446 out of
2,556, see Table 5) are actually true positives (correctly-detected
malicious ows), recalling our noisy training data may contain some
malicious trac (§2.2). We nd most of these actual true-positive
ows (79.8%, 1,953 out of 2,446) are UDP ows with malicious
destination ports. We also nd a small fraction of them using
malicious source ports (0.2% or 4), and a few with at least one
packet with bad payload content (that fails regular expressions
required by in-house mitigation’s heuristics) (0.1% or 2). (We show
in §4.3 that our models could detect some malicious ows with bad
packet payload content based on anomalies in ow features.)
We next show a few false positives (3.2%, 82 out of 2,446) are
artifacts due to misdirected TCP ows (Table 5). ese misdirected
ows appear to originate from our 5 VIPs, yet the pcaps we study
contain only inbound packets to these VIPs (§2.2). ese misdi-
rected ows thus have wrong values of zeros for some of our fea-
tures such as source-to-destination packet counts and rates (Table 2).
We conrm that these ows’ directions are actually mis-labeled
due to a known limitation of Argus.
Lastly, we show the remaining 28 false positives are likely actual
false positives. Each of them (all TCP ows) does not match any of
in-house mitigation’s heuristics.
We conclude that only a tiny fraction of false positives reported
in §3.1, are actual false positives (1.1%, 28 out of 2,556), suggesting
the actual false positive rate is near zero (0.00%, 28 of 696,000 test
benign ows). (We explore the potential causes for these actual
false positives in §4.2.)
3.3 Detection Accuracy On All Malicious Flows
We next explore how well our models detect all malicious ows we
have, recalling test datasets contain only half of them (§2.3). We
group malicious ows by their main anomalies as detected in-house
mitigation, and show which anomalies are best detected by our
models, and which are poorly detected.
Our models are near perfect at detecting anomalies on allow-
listed features (those with mostly malicious values besides a few
benign values, judged by in-house mitigation’s heuristics) with
unordered values: destination port and protocol. As a result, our
models capture all ows with malicious protocol (100.00% of about
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Total Flows by Main Anomalies Detected Flows
Main Anomaly Count Count Frac of Total
Flows w Bad Protocol 15,206 15,206 100.00%
UDP Flows w Bad Dst Port 1,261,951 1,260,943 99.92%
UDP Flows w Bad Src Port 5,334 5,201 97.5%
UDP Flows w Too Small Payload 2,522 215 8.5%
UDP Flows w Bad Payload Contents 8,229 2,036 24.7%
Table 6: Detection to All Malicious Flows Breakdown
15k) and nearly all UDP ows with malicious destination ports
(99.92% of about 1M), see Table 6.
Our models are reasonable at detecting anomalies on deny-listed
features (those with mostly benign values besides a few malicious
values, judged by in-house mitigation’s heuristics) with unordered
values: source port. Our models identify most UDP ows with
malicious source ports (97.5% of 5k).
However, we nd our models are bad at detecting anomalies on
deny-listed features with ordered values: ow packet sizes. Our
models detect only a few malicious ows (8.5% of about 3k) contain-
ing packets with too-small payload (in-house mitigation drops UDP
packets with payload smaller than a threshold), as in Table 6. (In
§4.1, we show that our models infer if a UDP ow contains packets
with too-small payloads based on feature maximum and minimum
ow packet size, recalling Table 2.)
Lastly, our models detect a quarter of UDP ows (24.7% of 8k)
containing packets with bad payload contents (that fail regular
expressions required by in-house mitigation), despite our models
do not see packet payloads (Table 6).
4 INTERPRETING DETECTION OF
MALICIOUS FLOWS
A contribution of our work is to interpret why ML-based AD detects
certain anomalies beer than others. We show that our models are
beer at detecting anomalies on allow-listed features than those on
deny-listed features because they are more likely to learn correct
normality for allow-listed features (§4.1). Our models are beer at
detecting anomalies on unordered features than those on ordered
features because even with incomplete normality, our models could
still detect anomalies on unordered feature with high recall (§4.2).
Lastly, our models detect anomalies on packet payload content by
combining multiple ow features (§4.3).
We summarize key takeaways from our interpretation results
in Table 7 and describe our interpretation results’ implications on
using autoencoder-based AD in production later in §5.
4.1 Learning Normalities for Features
We show our models are more likely to learn correct normality for
allow-listed features (destination port and protocol) than for deny-
listed features (source port and ow packet sizes). e rationale
is that since our models learn frequently seen values in training
data as normality, it is more likely for allow-listed features to have
all their benign values frequently seen in training data and thus
learned as normality because they have, by denition (§3.3), only a
few benign values. (We show how the normalities learned aect
our detection of anomalies later in §4.2.)
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Figure 3: Normalized Reconstruction Errors for 100 Base
Flows from SR1VP2 using Dierent Destination Ports
Allow-listed Destination Port: We show our models correctly
learn normality for destination port (with all values being mali-
cious except one benign value, per in-house mitigation’s heuristics)
because the one benign port is the most frequent among training
data.
We explore the normality our models learn for destination ports
with counterfactual explanation (§2.4.2). We randomly draw 100
UDP ows, detected as benign, from each VIP’s test datasets as base
ows, alter these 500 base ows by enumerating their destination
ports from 0 to 65535 with a step size of 51 (0, 51, … 65535) and
feed altered ows into models. e step size is because our models
merge each 51 adjacent ports to one feature (§2.2). We then watch
for how base ows’ errors change as destination ports change.
We show our models correctly learn the normality of destination
ports by consistently considering base ows with malicious ports
more abnormal than the same ows with the one benign port. We
use reconstruction errors from SR2VP1’s 100 base ows as example
(other VIPs are similar). Since we only care about how a base ow’s
error changes as its destination port changes (rather than the exact
values of these errors) and want to compare these changes across
all 100 base ows from this VIP, we normalize the set of errors
resulted from one base ow using dierent destination ports to
range [0, 1] by dividing these errors with the maximum error found
among them. We plot normalized errors for SR2VP1’s 100 base
ows with dierent destination ports as blue dots in Figure 3. We
show that all malicious ports lead to similarly high reconstruction
errors and this paern is very consistent across all 100 base ows
from SR2VP1 (represented by the horizontal blue line at normalized
error 1 in Figure 3). We also show consistently low errors (at most
0.46) at the one benign port for SR2VP1 (shown as the blue dots to
the le of port 5000 and below error 0.5 in Figure 3).
Allow-listed Protocol: We show our models learn incomplete
normality for protocols. Per in-house mitigation’s heuristic, all
protocols are malicious except UDP (for SR1, SR2 and SR3), TCP (for
SR1 and SR3) and 3 other protocols (for SR3 only, exact protocols
omied for security). However our models only learn UDP as
benign because the other 4 protocols are infrequent in training
data.
We explore normality our models learn for protocols by applying
counterfactual explanation to the same 500 base ows from destina-
tion port analysis, varying their protocols from 0 to 255 (with a step
size of 1) and watch for how their reconstruction error changes.
We show our models learn incomplete normality for protocols by
consistently considering based ows with non-UDP protocols more
abnormal than same ows with UDP. For example, in SR3VP1’s
normalized errors (Figure 4), we nd blue dots representing UDP
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No. Descriptions
1 Autoencoder can be trained successful with noisy data (§3), provided all benign values of target feature appear frequently in this data (§4.1)
2 Autoencoder can reliably detect anomalies on features whose benign values are frequent among training data (§4.1) and who are also unordered (§4.2)
3 Autoencoder almost always combines anomalies from multiple features in detection (§4.3), using even features that are less intuitive for human (§4.2)
Table 7: Key Takeaways from Interpretation Results
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Figure 4: Normalized Reconstruction Errors for 100 Base
Flows from SR3VP1 using Dierent Protocols
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Figure 5: Normalized Reconstruction Errors for 100 Base
Flows from SR2VP1 using Dierent Source Ports
(at protocol 17) consistently correspond to low errors (at most 0.56).
(Other 4 VIPs are similar.)
We believe that our models fail to learn non-UDP benign pro-
tocols because they are infrequent in training data. While UDP
accounts for almost all training data for our 5 VIPs (99.87% of 4.5M),
TCP accounts for only a tiny fraction (0.01% of 4.5M) and the 3 other
benign protocols for SR3 are completely missing. We note that TCP
ows show up even less than noises in training data (ows with
malicious protocols, showing up in 0.11% of 4.5M), suggesting that
it actually makes sense for our models to ignore infrequent benign
protocols like TCP otherwise it risks learning noises.
Deny-listed Source Port: We show our models are unlikely to
learn correct normality for deny-listed features like source port
because their values are mostly benign (per denition §3.3) and it is
unlikely for all their benign values to be frequently seen in training
data and learned as normality.
We explore normalities our models learn for source port by
applying similar counterfactual explanation analysis as we do for
destination port.
We show our models fail to learn the correct normality for source
ports. Per in-house mitigation’s heuristic, most source ports are
benign (besides 1024 and 1023 malicious ports) for SR1 and SR2
and all source ports are benign for SR3. However, our models only
consider a few source ports frequently seen in training data (“fre-
quent training ports”) as relatively normal. As an example, we
show reconstruction errors of SR2VP1’s 100 base ows in Figure 5.
(We summarize results for other 4 VIPs later.) We nd for SR2VP1,
source port 3111 (blue dots le of port 5000 and below error 0.5
in Figure 5) consistently lead to low errors (at most 0.38) while
the rest ports lead to high errors (see horizontal blue line at error
1). We believe the reason for port 3111’s low errors is that it cor-
responds to benign source port 3074 which is the most frequent
among SR2VP1’s training data, (in 75.31% of 998k training UDP
ows), considering our models do not distinguish among port 3061
to 3111 due to our grouping of adjacent 51 ports during one-hot
encoding (§2.2). We nd similar trend in reconstruction errors for
other 4 VIPs: low error with the most frequent training source port
(all benign) and high errors with the rest source ports. e only
exception is that we nd one malicious source port for SR1VP1
(omied for security) also leads to low error due to it is the second
most frequent among SR1VP1’s training data (in 1.21% of 999k UDP
training ows, recalling our training data is noisy). We conclude
that our models learn incorrect normality for SR1VP1 (considering
one benign and one malicious source ports normal) and incomplete
normality for other 4 VIPs (considering one benign port normal).
Deny-listed Packet Sizes: Similarly, our models are not likely
to learn correct normality for deny-listed ow packet sizes.
Our models detect malicious ows with too-small-payload UDP
packets (Table 6), without actually seeing packet payload, by iden-
tifying malicious combinations of sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz (maxi-
mum and minimum ow packet sizes, see Table 2). e rationale is
that we nd malicious ows with too-small-payload UDP packets
in our data for SR2VP1 (other VIPs do not lter on payload sizes)
are either made of all 56 or all 60-byte packets. As a result, these
malicious ows have only two possible combinations of sMaxPktSz
and sMinPktSz (both 56 or both 60). Since these two sMaxPktSz and
sMinPktSz combinations are rare among SR2VP1’s UDP training
ows (0.01% of 998M, not bad comparing to, for example, 0.46%
noises for benign destination ports), detecting ows with too-small-
payload packets is equivalent to detecting ows with malicious
sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz combinations (both 56 and both 60).
We study the normality our models learn for sMaxPktSz and
sMinPktSz combinations with counterfactual explanation. We ran-
domly draw 10 base ows from each of our 5 VIPs’ test dataset,
vary sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz in base ows from 0 to 512 bytes
(the largest packet size in our data) with a step size of 1 and watch
how base ows’ errors change.
We show our models learn incomplete normality for sMaxPktSz
and sMinPktSz combinations, by considering frequent combina-
tions in training data, instead of all benign combinations (all except
both 56 and both 60 for SR2VP1 and all combinations for other 4
VIPs), as relatively normal. Our models for SR1’s three VIPs con-
sider base ows relatively normal when sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz
are both small (Figure 6a shows reconstruction errors of one base
ow from SR1VP1) because they mostly see small sMaxPktSz and
sMinPktSz (at most 104 bytes) in training data (Figure 7). e only
exception is that we nd a few training UDP ows for SR1VP1
(about 1.42% of 999M) have large sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz (both
512 bytes, see blue pluses on top right corner of SR1VP1 chart in
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Figure 6: Reconstruction Errors (Unit: Tdet from Equation 3) for 1 Base Flow from 3 VIPs with Varying Packet Sizes (Byte)
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Figure 7: Frequent sMaxPktSz (X axis) and sMinPktSz (Y axis) Combinations in TrainingUDPFlows (At Least 1000Occurrence).
Figure 7). However our model for SR1VP1 still considers sMaxPk-
tSz and sMinPktSz of both 512 abnormal (see the red on top right
corner of Figure 6a), likely treating these training ows as noises.
Our model for SR2VP1 considers base ows relatively normal when
sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz are similar in value (Figure 6b shows
reconstruction errors for one base ow from SR2VP1) because it
mostly sees similar sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz (both from 74 to 512
bytes) in training data (Figure 7). Our model for SR3VP1 consid-
ers base ows relatively normal when sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz
are both large (Figure 6c shows reconstruction errors for one base
ows from SR3VP1) because it mostly see large sMaxPktSz and
sMinPktSz (at least 397 bytes) in training data (Figure 7).
4.2 Detecting Anomalies on Features
We next show that with correct normality, our models achieve reli-
able detection for anomalies on unordered feature (destination port).
With incomplete normalities, our models stills detect anomalies
on unordered features (protocol and source port) with high recall
but risk false positives. Lastly, we show that incomplete normali-
ties could lead to low-recall detections for anomalies on ordered
features (ow packet sizes).
Unordered Destination Port: We show that the correct nor-
mality our models learn for destination port is key to the reliable de-
tection of almost all ows with malicious destination ports (99.92%;
1,260,943 out of 1,261,951, from Table 6). Feature aribution analysis
(§2.4.1) conrms that most (98.55%) of these true-positive detections
are mainly triggered by anomalies from destination ports, providing
in average 0.80× threshold of reconstruction errors. For the rest
reconstruction errors (in average 0.20× threshold) needed, our mod-
els rely on anomalies on other features (mainly Sport, sMaxPktSz,
sMinPktSz and SIntPkt from Table 2, with at least 10% aributions
in from 84% to 3.53% of these detections).
We argue that the tiny fraction of ows with malicious destina-
tion ports that our models miss (0.08%, see Table 6) are artifacts of
our one-hot encoding of destination port rather than actual false
negatives of our models’ detection. Recalling our models can not
distinguish among adjacent 51 destination ports since we group
them as one one-hot feature (§2.2), our models consider these ows
benign because their malicious destination ports are adjacent to
the benign port (within 51).
Unordered Protocol: Despite learning incomplete normality,
we show our models still detect all 15,206 ows (Table 6) with ma-
licious protocols (all except UDP, TCP and three other protocols,
recalling §4.1) by simply considering all ow with non-UDP proto-
col as equally abnormal (see the horizontal blue line at normalized
error of 1 for all non-UDP protocols in Figure 4). Feature aribu-
tion conrms that these true-positive detections are completely
triggered by anomalies from protocols.
However by considering all non-UDP protocols equally abnor-
mal, our models risk agging ows with non-UDP benign protocols
(such as TCP for SR1 and SR3) as malicious (false positives). causing
the 28 false-positive detections our models made on test dataset (all
TCP ows), recalling §3.2.
Unordered Source Port: Similarly, our models detect most
ows with malicious source ports (5,201 out of 5,334, 97.5%, re-
calling Table 6), despite failing to learn the correct normalities, by
considering all infrequent training source ports (including all but
one malicious ports for SR1VP1 and all malicious ports for other
4 VIPs) equally abnormal. While our models risk false-positive
detection by considering benign source ports that are infrequent in
training data as relatively abnormal, we see no such false positives
in test data (as shown in §3.2).
Feature aribution analysis conrms that most (99.79%) of these
true-positive detections are mainly triggered by anomaly from
source ports, providing in average about 0.79× threshold of recon-
struction errors. For the remaining reconstruction error needed (in
average about 0.21× threshold), our models rely on anomaly from
additional features (mainly sMaxPktSz, sMinPktSz, SIntPkt, SrcPkts,
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TcpOpt M and sTtl from Table 2, with at least 10% aribution in
from 85.63% to 1.6% of these detections.)
We note that none of our models’ 133 false-negative detection
are due to they incorrectly consider one malicious source port from
SR1VP1 as relatively normal (recalling §4.1). ese false negatives
are all due to our models cannot nd enough anomalies from addi-
tional features (besides source ports) to trigger detection.
Ordered Packet Sizes: We show that with incomplete nor-
mality for ordered features, our models risk low-recall detections.
While for unordered features like ports and protocols, our models
consider values dierent from frequent training values as equally
abnormal, our models consider values of ordered features that are
more dierent from frequent training values as more abnormal (see
the gradual color changes from blue on le boom to red on top
right in Figure 6a as an example). As a result, our models risk con-
sidering malicious values for ordered features as relatively normal
if they happen to be numerically close to the frequent training
values.
We show that with incomplete normality, our model for SR2VP1
incorrectly consider the malicious sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz com-
binations (both 56 and both 60 bytes) as relatively normal (shown
as the blue boom le corner of Figure 6b) because these malicious
combinations happen to be numerically close to some frequent
training combinations (both 74 bytes, as shown in SR2VP1’s chart
in Figure 7). As a result, our models only detect a few ows with
these malicious combinations (8.5%, 215 out of 2,522, from Table 6).
Feature aribution analysis conrms that in these 215 true-positive
detections, our model almost exclusively relies on anomalies from
features other than sMaxPktSz and sMinPktSz.
4.3 Using Anomalies from Multiple Features
Lastly, we show that our models almost always combine anomalies
from multiple ow features in detection, enabling our models to
detect a quarter UDP ows with malicious packet payload contents
(24.7%, 2,036 out of 8,229, in Table 6) even when they cannot see
packet payload contents. We breaking down number of features
with signicant aributions (at least 10%) in our models’ detection
of all 1.2M malicious ows in Table 6 and show that our models uses
multiple signicantly-aributing features in nearly all detections
(99.90% of 1.2M) and uses 4 in most detections (79.16% of 1.2M).We
argue that combining anomalies from multiple features is actually
necessary for our models’ detection by showing that almost all of
these detected malicious ows would be missed (97.15% of 1.2M) if
only using anomalies from the highest aributing features.
5 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
We next distill our interpretation results to three implications: train-
ing with noisy real-world data is possible (§5.1), autoencoder can
reliably detect real-world anomalies on well-represented unordered
features (§5.2) and combinations of autoencoder-based AD and
heuristic-based lters can help both (§5.3).
5.1 Training with Noisy Data is Possible
Our results show autoencoder-based AD models can be trained
successfully on real-world data with noises, provided target features
are well-represented: all benign values of target feature must appear
frequently in the training data. Our results support prior claim that
aack-free training data does not exist outside simulation [7] (we
nd some brief aacks in our training data), but we disprove the
claim that noisy data makes AD training impossible.
We prove this ability to train on noisy data, showing that our
autoencoder-based AD can learn normality in spite of noise. For
example, our models learn correct normality of destination port
despite noise in the training data (0.46% of 4.5M UDP ows have
malicious destination port) because the benign port is the most
frequent in training data (99.54% of 4.5M UDP ows), recalling §4.1.
We also show that for under-represented features, noise can be
confused with normality, because both noise and some of their
benign values are infrequent. For example, in §4.1, our models fail
to learn benign protocol TCP (in 0.01% of training ows) as normal
likely due to our models consider TCP as noises, considering actual
noises (in 0.22% of training ows) are more frequent than TCP. Our
model for SR1VP1 learns a malicious source port (noise) as normal
because this port is the second most frequent in training data (in
1.21% of training UDP ows) and is more frequent than almost all
benign sort ports.
5.2 Autoencoder Reliably Detects Anomalies
on Well-represented Unordered Features
Our results suggest that autoencoder-based AD could reliably de-
tects real-world DDoS aacks, but only when all benign values for
the DDoS ow’s anomalous feature appear frequently in training
data (so that our models could learn these benign values as normal)
and when this anomalous feature is unordered (so that our models
could crisply infer all the other values as abnormal). If some benign
values for this anomalous feature are infrequent in training data
(as is usually the case for deny-listed features), our models risk
considering these benign values as abnormal (false positives). If
this feature is ordered (such as packet rates, counts and sizes), even
when all of its benign values appear frequently in training data, our
models still risk considering malicious values numerically close to
these benign values as normal (false negatives).
Our results thus refute the claim from prior work based on lab
trac that autoencoder-based AD detects DDoS aacks reliably
(with true positive rate of 100% and false positive rate of near 0) [17].
Our results suggest that an autoencoder-based AD will not detect
sucient aacks if it is the only DDoS-detection method in produc-
tion environment. We instead recommend using autoencoder-based
AD as a compliment to heuristic-based DDoS lters, see §5.3.
5.3 Combine AD and Heuristic-Based Filters
Finally, we show the potential for joint use of autoencoder-based
AD and heuristic-based lters (like in-house mitigation), since each
has its own strengths.
We nd our models are very good at nding and using anomalies
from multiple features (4 in detection to most malicious ows §4.3).
ML-based AD is particularly important when the anomalies are
not obvious to human perception, such as anomalies in ow inter-
packet arrival time, packet count and packet TTLs (recalling §4.2).
However, our models are not very certain about each one of these
anomalies and would miss 97.15% of its detected malicious ows if
only using the highest-aributing feature (§4.3).
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e heuristic-base lter, by relying on human expertise, is very
good at detecting malicious ow based on single anomaly. (While
in-house mitigation uses multiple heuristic-based lters, only one
lter is used in each detection: the highest-priority lter triggered.)
For example, a ow with malicious destination port is certainly
malicious because the server only serves a short list of benign ports.
However we argue that it is more challenging for heuristic-based
lters to make use of more subtle features to indicate malice, such
as ow inter-packet arrival time or packet TTLs. Our models are
able to make use of these features (§4.2), and can combine multiple
suggestive features (§4.3).
We propose two possible strategies to combine autoencoder-
based AD and heuristic-based lters. e rst is to simply stack
them: apply the heuristic lter rst, to cover intuitive anomalies
with great certainty. en add ML-based AD to covering addi-
tional anomalies that are not obvious or require combinations of
features. Our second strategy is to build new heuristics based on
interpretations of what the autoencoder-based AD has discovered,
as discussed in §4. Such “ML-discovered” lters could directly use
the ML model, or we could extract the relevant features into a new
implementation.
6 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst aempt to address
the two limitations (limited evaluation dataset and no detection
interpretations) in prior DDoS detection study using ML-based AD.
6.1 DDoS Study using ML-based AD
e most related class of prior work are those also detect DDoS
aacks with ML-AD models.
Most prior work in this class train some form of ML-AD models,
such as one-class SVM models ([5, 38, 45]) and neural network mod-
els ([17, 20, 20]) with benign trac and detect aacks by looking for
deviations from these benign trac. Since these prior work mostly
test their models with limited datasets including simulation [5, 10],
lab trac [17, 20, 38, 45] and DARPA/MIT dataset [38], it is not
clear how well their methods could work in real-world production
environment ([7, 34]). Moreover, they usually do not interpret their
models’ detection decision nor explore why their models work or
not work in detecting certain DDoS aacks. In comparison, we
evaluate our models with real-world benign and aack trac from
a major cloud provider and interpret why our models work well on
aacks of certain anomalies but not as well on the others.
K-means [40] and single-linkage [23] have previously been used
as clustering algorithms to separate benign and malicious trac
ows into dierent clusters. Although their detection results are
intuitively interpretable (a ow is agged as malicious since its
features are qualitatively close to features of other ows in the
“malicious cluster”), they rely on manual inspection to determine
which clusters are malicious. ey also evaluate their methods
with limited datasets (lab data [40] and KDD datasets [23]). In
comparison, we do not rely on manual inspection for our detection,
and we test our methods on real-world trac from a large cloud
platform.
6.2 DDoS Study using Other Techniques
Many prior work detect DDoS aacks with other techniques. We
classify them into following 3 classes.
ML-based binary classication: is class of papers train
some form of ML binary classication models (such as KNN [6],
decision tree [6, 32], two-class SVM [9, 11], random forest [6] and
neural network models [27–29]) with both benign and aack trac.
ese ML models thus identify aacks similar to the ones they
have seen during training. In comparison, we focus on a dierent
model (ML-AD model) and by training with only benign trac and
looking for deviations from these benign trac, our models do not
rely on on knowledge of known aacks and have the ability to
identify potential unknown aacks.
Statistical AD: is class of papers apply statistical models
(such as adaptive threshold [33], cumulative sum [22, 33], entropy-
based analysis [15] and Bayesian theorem [12]) to identify abnormal
trac paern that is signicantly dierent from some or all of
previously seen (benign) trac paern. ese papers thus could
also cover potentially unknown aacks. In comparison, we focus
on AD based on ML models instead of statistical models.
Heuristic-based rule: is class of papers use heuristic-based
rules to detect specic types of aacks matching their heuristics.
For example, history-based IP ltering remembers frequent remote
IPs during peace time and consider trac from other IPs during
aack time as potential DDoS trac [39]. Hop-count based ltering
identies spoofed DDoS packets by remembering peace-time IP
to (estimated) hop count mapping and considering packets with
unusual IP-to-hop-count mapping during aack time as spoofed
DDoS packets [43]. In comparison, we use a dierent method (ML-
based AD) and could cover many dierent types of aacks instead
of only a specic type.
7 CONCLUSION
is paper addresses two limitations in prior studies of ML-based
AD: use of real-world data, and interpretation of why the models are
successful. We apply autoencoder-based AD to 57 real-world DDoS
events captured at 5 VIPs of a large commercial cloud provider. We
use feature aribution and counterfactual techniques to explain
when our models work well and when they do not. Key results
are that our models detect most, if not all, malicious ows to 4
VIPs under aacks, with near-zero false positives. Interpretation
shows our models are beer at detecting anomalies on allow-listed
features than those on deny-listed features because our models are
more likely to learn correct normality for allow-listed features. We
then show that our models are beer at detecting anomalies on
unordered features than those on ordered features because even
with incomplete normality, our models could still detect anomalies
on unordered feature with high recall. Key implications of our work
are that training with noisy data is possible, that autoencoder-based
AD can reliably detect anomalies on well-represented unordered
features and that autoencoder-based AD and heuristic-based lters
have complementary strengths.
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